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Employer liability is rarely disputed in most claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The more routine decisions constituting employment
discrimination - hirings, firings, promotions, etc. - are easily attributed to the
employer who granted her or his supervisors or agents the authority to make
such judgments. Strict liability is the norm and few decisions even address the
issue. When the claim of "harassment" was added to the list of possible
discriminatory acts, however, employers challenged both the validity of the
claim and their own responsibility for it.
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized the claim of hostile environment
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. But the
Court's ruling offered some hope to employers by narrowly defining the cause of
action and limiting the employer's responsibility for actions of both supervisors
and co-workers. The Court rejected the strict liability principle applicable to
virtually every other employment claim under the statute, but offered no clear
guidelines on when liability was appropriate. Instead, the parties were directed
simply to "look to agency principles."2 The lower courts struggled with this
concept for over a decade with varying results. Finally, in 1998, the Court
provided much-needed guidance and ended some of the uncertainty on the
employer liability issue. In the companion cases of Faragher v. City of Boca
34Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,4 the Court resolved the question
of when a company might be held vicariously responsible for the actions of its
supervisors even when the harassing conduct was unknown to it.
At the time Faragher and Burlington Industries were handed down, the
Court's instructions seemed relatively straightforward. Although the holdings
were limited to the issue of vicarious liability for unreported supervisor
harassment, the Court's opinions included a comprehensive review of sexual
harassment liability theories. Applying the agency law principles established in
1986, the Court addressed the most common possibilities: 1) supervisor
harassment resulting in a tangible employment action (e.g., loss of job, failure to
obtain promotion, etc., formerly labeled as "quid pro quo" harassment), 2) co-
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
2. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986).
3. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
4. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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worker hostile environment harassment, 3) supervisor hostile environment
harassment reported to the employer, and 4) supervisor hostile environment
harassment unknown to the employer.
The Court suggested a somewhat different liability analysis for each of the
four categories of sexual harassment, although much of the analysis was dicta
concerning issues not presented in the cases before it. Tangible employment
actions result in strict liability. Co-worker harassment, the Court indicated, is
subject to a negligence standard for liability - actionable only when the
employer knew (or should have known) of the misconduct and failed to take
action. Liability for supervisor harassment reported to the employer also turns on
the question of "negligence," focusing on the employer's own actions in
responding to the complaint. The actual holdings of Faragher and Burlington
Industries, however, considered only the fourth category of supervisor
harassment unknown to the employer. The Court concluded that an employer is
vicariously liable in these circumstances unless the employer can establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a two-prong affirmative defense. Prong one asks
whether the employer has made past efforts to prevent and correct harassment,
usually satisfied by the existence of an anti-harassment policy including a
complaint process. Prong two requires the employer to establish that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to utilize that policy's grievance procedure or to avoid the
harm otherwise.
In spite of the care taken by the Faragher/Burlington Industries Court to
distinguish the various liability situations, most lower courts have used the
Court's affirmative defense to determine both "vicarious" liability for unknown
supervisor harassment and "direct" liability for the employer's response (or lack
of response) to known supervisor harassment. Only three circuits seem to
acknowledge that the situations are different, and that the Court's holdings were
limited to those cases in which the employer is ignorant of the supervisor's
conduct.
The extension (or misapplication) of the Faragher/Burlington Industries
standard raises several fundamental questions. First, is such an extension
warranted by those cases as the next logical step in the development of liability
law, or have the lower courts unintentionally overstepped the Supreme Court's
carefully erected boundaries? Policies articulated in Faragher/Burlington
Industries may be well served by such an extension, but at a minimum the courts
need to consider modifications to the defense to better match the standard to the
difference in circumstances. In a case where the plaintiff promptly reports the
harassment, the employer is unable to satisfy the literal meaning of prong two of
the Faragher/Burlington Industries defense, regardless of how laudably he may
have responded to the complaint.
Second, if different analyses are warranted for vicarious and direct liability,
the courts may need to evaluate more carefully what constitutes "knowledge"
within this context. In many cases of direct liability, the plaintiff has utilized the
employer's grievance process and the fact of knowledge is undisputed. In other
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cases, however, there is some disagreement among the lower courts about when
knowledge may be imputed to the employer and the extent to which an employer
may control the issue by insisting on formal reporting channels.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, does the extension/misapplication of
Faragher/Burlington Industries mean claims of reported supervisor harassment
are being decided differently under the affirmative defense than they would be
under a negligence analysis? In many cases the answer may be "no," even
though the courts are unnecessarily complicating their analyses. The questions of
whether an employer was "negligent" in responding to a complaint (under a
"direct" liability/negligence analysis) and whether the employer acted
"reasonably" in correcting reported harassment (under the Faragher/Burlington
Industries affirmative defense) are much the same from a practical perspective,
particularly in a trial context. A jury is likely to view the
negligence/reasonableness issues as two sides of the same coin. Nonetheless,
under a negligence analysis the plaintiff retains the burden of proof on liability,
while that burden shifts to the defendant under the affirmative defense of
Faragher and Burlington Industries. It seems inherently troubling - if not
downright backwards - to conclude that an employer who never knew of the
harassment is actually worse off (in terms of the burden of proof) than the
employer who knew of the alleged misconduct and had an opportunity to
respond.
Furthermore, for those cases decided on summary judgment, shifting the
burden of proof could - or should - have an impact. If the courts are placing the
burden of proof on liability on the back of the employer in all hostile
environment cases, one might expect fewer summary judgments for employers
on that issue. By the same token, the plaintiff's ability to obtain summary
judgment on the liability question should be enhanced. In fact, neither appears to
be happening. No cases are granting summary judgment for the plaintiff on this
issue (and, indeed, research has failed to reveal a single attempt at such a
motion). Summary judgment for the defendant, on the other hand, often is
granted with little serious discussion or analysis of the burden of proof issue.
Part One of my analysis provides a brief overview of the development of
employer liability standards in sexual harassment law, including a discussion of
the Faragher and Burlington Industries holdings. Part Two surveys the
application of these cases in the lower courts since the 1998 decisions, including
the developing conflict of what constitutes "knowledge" on the part of the
employer and the courts' use of summary judgment. Finally, Part Three
examines the possible solutions to the lower courts' confusion and proposes a set
of standard designed to further Title VI's "primary objective" of prevention.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
"Hostile environment" harassment, as an actionable form of discrimination
under Title VII, was first recognized under the protected classification of race.5
When presented with allegations of a racially charged work environment, many
courts were willing to acknowledge that such an atmosphere could become
sufficiently offensive to alter the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment ' 6 within the meaning of the statute. Accepting the claim of
harassment on the basis of sex proved to be more of a challenge, however. The
courts readily adopted the concept of "quid pro quo" harassment, where a job or
benefit was made dependant on a subordinate's reaction to a supervisor's
demands or advances (e.g., "sleep with me or you're fired").7 But with respect to
hostile environment claims - involving offensive conduct but without any
impact on job benefits, such as pay or promotions - some courts worried about
8distinguishing welcome flirtations from abusive advances.
The controversy about the viability of hostile environment sexual harassment
claims was put to rest in 1986. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,9 plaintiff
Mechelle Vinson alleged that she was repeatedly fondled and even raped by her
supervisor over a three-year period. Ms. Vinson made no claim that her pay or
advancement was affected by this behavior. The Supreme Court agreed that a
claim of sex discrimination under Title VII could be based on such allegations
even absent some effect on more tangible employment terms. Ending years of
debate, the Court concluded that harassment could constitute a violation of Title
VII when it became "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." 10
A subsidiary dispute in Meritor Savings was the issue of the bank's liability
for the supervisor's actions, even assuming the behavior could be categorized as
"discrimination" within the meaning of the statute. For most discrimination
claims under Title VII, employer liability is imputed to the employer without
5. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (acknowledging the existence of a possible claim
based on the employer's practice of segregating patients by race, later described by the Supreme Court as
"apparently the first case to recognize a cause of action based upon discriminatory work environment," Meritor
Sa. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65). For a more complete discussion of the development of harassment law, see Susan
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 816-26 (1991); B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing
Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (1993).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff fired for refusing
supervisor's demands for sexual favors); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d
Cir. 1977)(plaintiff's continued employment conditioned on sexual relations with her supervisor).
8. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 E Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (speculating that
hostile environment claims on the basis of sex could create "a potential federal lawsuit every time any
employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another"), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977).
9. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
10. Id. at 67, quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
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discussion. The Act prohibits discrimination by an employer and its agents,1
and the courts have always held the employer responsible for a supervisor's
misuse of delegated authority to hire, fire, or otherwise control employment
terms.12 As noted by the Supreme Court, "[c]ourts have consistently held
employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory
personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved
of the supervisor's actions."
13
Based on the strict liability standard applied in other types of Title VII
claims, Ms. Vinson argued in Meritor Savings Bank that the employer similarly
should be held legally responsible for the supervisor's actions, regardless of
management's knowledge of the behavior.14 The district court had denied
liability because the bank had a policy prohibiting harassment and the plaintiff
failed to file a complaint under that policy.15 The appellate court, on the other
hand, agreed with Ms. Vinson that employers are absolutely liable for their
supervisors' discriminatory actions, whether aware of the misconduct or not.
16
The Supreme Court was clear in its rejection of the strict liability standard, but
not much else. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "erred in
concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment
by their supervisors," but explicitly declined the opportunity to "issue a
definitive rule."' 7 Instead, the Court agreed with the position of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 18 that the courts should "look to
agency principles" for guidance.
19
Until 1998, the lower courts struggled with the application of agency
principles, with varying results. The courts uniformly applied strict liability for
quid pro quo harassment, since such cases closely parallel the more traditional
claims of Title VII discrimination, such as a termination decision based on
race. 20 There was also judicial consensus in co-worker (non-supervisor)
harassment cases; the courts consistently held the employer liable for the
harassment only where the employer had knowledge of the misconduct and
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining the term "employer" to include "any agent of such a person").
12. See Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30
GEORGIA L. REv. 509, 516-22 (1996) (discussing vicarious liability in employment discrimination law).
13. MeritorSav. Bank, 477 U.S. at70-71.
14. Id. at 70.
15. Vinson. v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), aff'don other grounds sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vimson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150-51 (D.C. Cit. 1985), affd on other grounds sub nom. Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. The rejection of strict liability was by a narrow five to four
margin, however. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens would have adopted the strict liability
standard. Id. at 74-78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with the enforcement of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
19. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
20. Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 112, 1127
(10th Cit. 1993); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); Shager v.
Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th
Cir. 1989); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983).
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failed to respond appropriately.2 1 For supervisor hostile environment harassment,
however, the lower court approaches ranged from versions of strict liability to
22negligence liability for failure to correct known harassment. Burlington
23 24
Industries v. Ellerth23 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, handed down near
the end of the Supreme Court's 1997-98 term, sought to resolve at least some of
this conflict.
Burlington Industries and Faragher considered identical issues. In both
cases, the question was whether an employer could be subject to vicarious
liability for supervisor misconduct that was never reported or otherwise known
to the employer, thus giving the employer no opportunity to correct or address
the misconduct. "We decide whether . . . an employee who refuses the
unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no
adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without




Burlington Industries involved the claims of Kimberly Ellerth, a former
salesperson for the defendant. Ms. Ellerth alleged various acts of inappropriate
conduct by her second level supervisor, but focused on three specific incidents as
possible threats to her continued employment.26 On one occasion, her supervisor
told her to "loosen up" and that he could make her life "very hard or very
easy.''27 During a promotion interview, the supervisor rubbed her knee and told
her she was not "loose enough." 28 Finally, in a third incident, the supervisor
suggested shorter skirts would make Ms. Ellerth's job "a whole heck of a lot
easier.",29 Ms. Ellerth resigned her position without reporting the behavior,
although she was aware of the company's anti-harassment policy and knew how
to make a complaint under that policy.30 The trial court granted summary
21. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc. 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997); McKenzie v.
Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473,480(7th Cir. 1996).
22. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (strict liability); Stacks v.
Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994) (negligence liability); ); Cortes v.
Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1992) (negligence liability); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422,
1436 (7th Cir. 1988) (strict liability). See generally George, supra note 5, at 3-8 (reviewing the development of
liability standards prior to Burlington Industries and Faragher); Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson,
Employer Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search
for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 667, 687-730 (offering a circuit-by-circuit review of liability
cases in this area). Cf White, supra note 12, at 523-53 (discussing vicarious liability as applied to hostile
environment sexual harassment).
23. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
24. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
25. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 746-47 (emphasis added).
26. One of the central issues of the case was whether Ms. Ellerth had alleged quid pro quo or hostile
environment harassment. Hoping to take advantage of the strict liability standard applied by the lower courts
for quid pro quo harassment, Ms. Ellerth argued that these "threats," even though never carried out, amounted
to quid pro quo harassment. The Supreme Court held that unfulfilled threats could only provide evidence of
hostile environment harassment. Id. at 751-54.
27. Id. at 748.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 748-49 ("During her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform anyone in authority about
Slowik's conduct, despite knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment. In fact, she chose not to
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judgment for the defendant on the ground that the employer was not responsible
for any harassment that may have occurred.3'
Beth Ann Faragher was a lifeguard over a five-year period for the City of
Boca Raton, Florida. She alleged repeated incidents of crude comments and
unwelcome touching by two of her supervisors. On one occasion she was
physically tackled and on another occasion, a supervisor pantomimed oral sex.32
Although the city had a sexual harassment policy, the policy had not been
communicated to the employees in Ms. Faragher's unit. Ms. Faragher was
unaware that the policy existed and never filed a complaint.33 The city lost at
trial, but the court of appeals reversed on the issue of liability.34
Unlike its brief reference in Meritor Savings, the Court in Burlington
Industries/Faragher offered a thorough primer on the application of agency
principles to the problem of sexual harassment liability. The Court began by
dispensing with the issue of "scope of employment," since torts committed
within that scope generally are the responsibility of the master without further
analysis.35 Consistent with the conclusion reached by the courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court agreed that "[tlhe general rule is that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment. 36
With respect to torts outside of the scope of employment, the Court
continued, the Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes four possible bases
for liability: (a) "the master intended the conduct," (b) "the master was
negligent," (c) "the conduct violated a non-delegable duty," or (d) " the servant
purported to act [for] the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation." 37 The Court quickly dismissed subsections (a) and (c) of the
Restatement as inapplicable to the usual circumstances of harassment and moved
on to concentrate on liability theories under subsections (b) and (d).
Before considering the issue of supervisor harassment, the Court referenced
the issue of co-worker harassment where the harasser has no supervisory
authority over the victim. The Court implicitly approved, albeit in dicta, the
unanimous conclusion of the lower courts that employers can be held
responsible for co-worker harassment only if they "knew (or should have
known) of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action 3-
inform her immediate supervisor (not Slowik) because 'it would be his duty as my supervisor to report any
incidents of sexual harassment."') (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 749.
32. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998).
33. Id. at 781-83.
34. Id. at 783-85.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 219(1) (1957) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"]; Burlington
Industries, 524 U.S. at 756-57.
36. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 757 (1998).
37. RESTATEMENT, § 219(2).
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Some courts have suggested, however-both before and
after Faragher and Burlington Industries--that the duty goes beyond the correction of reported harassment and
also includes some affirmative preventive obligation, described either as a duty to provide some avenue for
complaints, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994); Newtown v. Shell Oil Co.,
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described by the Supreme Court as "a negligence standard., 39 As characterized
by the Court, such liability presumably is justifiable only under subsection (b) of
the Restatement, based on the employer's own negligence.40 No concept of
"vicarious" liability is available in such circumstances. "In co-worker
harassment cases, the employer is liable, if at all, directly, not derivatively. ' 1
Turning to the question of supervisor harassment, the Court began with
subsection (b) of the Restatement. The employer's own negligence is at issue,
according to the Court, once the employer becomes aware of the alleged
misconduct:
Under subsection (b) [of Section 219(2) of the Restatement], an
employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the employer's own
negligence. § 219(2)(b). Thus, although a supervisor's sexual harassment
is outside the scope of employment because the conduct was for personal
motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own
negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with
respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the
conduct and failed to stop it .... [B]ut Ellerth seeks to invoke the more
stringent standard of vicarious liability.42
The Court thus makes an explicit distinction between "direct" liability (based on
the employer's own behavior in failing to correct known harassment) and
"vicarious" liability (based on the supervisor's conduct which is unknown to the
employer).
52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999), or reasonable actions to "discover" the harassment, e.g., Perry v.
Harris Chemin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the standard for liability for co-worker
harassment is whether the employer has been "negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment");
Franklin v. King Lincoln-Mercury-Suzuki, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (D. Md. 1999) (quoting Perry for the
same rule).
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
40. Id. at 799 ("Those courts [District Courts and Courts of Appeal] have . . . uniformly judg[ed]
employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard"); Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at
760 ("We turn to the aided in the agency relation standard [under subsection (d) of the RESTATEMENT]. In a
sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortuous objective by the existence of the
agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of potential victims. Were this to
satisfy the aided in the agency relations standard, an employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only
for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC
nor any court of appeals to have considered the issue.") (emphasis added); Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers,
Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e have defined the test as whether the employer 'knew or should
have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective
action') (quoting Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1996)); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) ("When an employee is harassed by a co-worker, the employer may
be held responsible only if 'the employer knew or should have known about an employee's acts of harassment
and fails to take appropriate remedial action,"') (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir.
1989)); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 938 F.2d 1264, 1275 (7th Cir. 1991) ("an employer will be liable for
discrimination by an employee 'if the employer knew or should have known about an employee's acts of
harassment and fails to take remedial action"' (quoting Brooms, 881 F.2d at 42); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997).
41. Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 E3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997) (cited by the Supreme
Court with approval in Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 760).
42. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 758-59 (emphasis added). Note that the standard generally applied by
the lower courts has been not that the employer actually "stop" the harassment but rather that he take action
"reasonably calculated" to end the behavior. Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 663 (6th Cir. 1999);
Intelekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 338 (9th Cir. 1992); Katz v. Dole, 709 E2d 251,256 (4th Cir. 1983).
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Moving on to the issue of vicarious liability presented in both Burlington
Industries and Faragher-assuming no knowledge of the harassment on the part
of the employer-the Court turned to the remaining provision of the
Restatement. Under Section 219(2)(d), a master may be responsible for acts
outside the scope of employment where "the servant . . . was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship. ' '43 Where a
supervisor's conduct involves "a tangible employment action" (such as a pay
raise or promotion), the Court held, vicarious liability is clear; it was the agency
relationship that provided the supervisor the authority to commit the "tort"-
"[t]he supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of
agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her
control.""
When hostile environment harassment is alleged in the absence of a
"tangible employment action," however, the Court described other
considerations.
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies
and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend
in part on an employer's effort to create such procedures, it would effect
Congress' intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the
Title VII context. To the extent limiting employer liability could
encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes
severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose. As
we have observed, Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable
consequences doctrine, and the considerations which animate that
doctrine would also support the limitation to employer liability in certain
circumstances.45
In fact, the "primary objective" of Title VII, according to the Court, "is not to
provide redress but to avoid harm.
46
Against this backdrop of policy concerns, the Court concluded that an
employer will be held vicariously liable for unreported supervisor harassment
unless he can establish, "by a preponderance of the evidence," a two part
affirmative defense. In general terms, if the employer had an anti-harassment
43. RESTATEMENT, § 219(2)(d).
44. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 654. The court goes on to say: "[W]e can identify a class of cases
where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the employment relation aids in commission of the
harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate. Every Federal
Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results
in a tangible employment action.... Although few courts have elaborated how agency principles support this
rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the aided in the agency relation standard. . . .When a
supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance that the injury could not have been
inflicted absent the agency relation.... The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class
of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.... Whatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirement will always be met when a supervisor
takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate." Id. at 760-61.
45. Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
46. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-806.
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policy in place and the employee failed to use it, the employer will not be held
responsible for the harassment.
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that
an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need
for a stated policy suitable to employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element
of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited
to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense.47
Thus, in reviewing the possible avenues of liability for the employer, the
Supreme Court implicitly or explicitly outlined the appropriate liability standards
in virtually all sexual harassment cases.
For co-worker harassment, the standard is one of direct liability based on the
employer's negligence-the employer is held responsible only if it knew (or
should have known) of the conduct and failed to respond appropriately. The
plaintiff retains the burden of proof on both issues.
For harassment resulting in a tangible employment action, strict liability is
imposed regardless of the employer's knowledge of the supervisor's actions.
Finally, for supervisor hostile environment harassment (not involving a
tangible employment action), the Court suggested one of two possibilities.
First, applying Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an
employer may be directly liable for his or her own negligence in responding to
known sexual harassment.
Second, under Section 219(2)(d), the employer is vicariously liable for
unknown harassment by a supervisor unless the defendant can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the two part affirmative defense.
II. THE CIRCUITS REACT
A. Vicarious and Direct Liability United
In spite of the lengthy discussions and analyses of employer liability in
Faragher and Burlington Industries, the lower courts are not in complete
47. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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agreement over their application. A substantial majority of the circuit courts have
adopted the Faragher/Burlington Industries affirmative defense as one of
universal application for all supervisor hostile environment harassment claims-
making no distinction between direct and vicarious liability. For cases in which
the plaintiff reported the harassment to the employer, the application is at best
awkward and at worst a complete misfit. The second prong of the defense,
requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize
the employer's grievance procedure, is often clearly refuted by the undisputed
fact of an internal grievance.
Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services
4
8
illustrates the problem. The plaintiff complained repeatedly to the employer
about several arguably racist remarks made by both supervisors and co-
workers. 49 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the alleged incidents were not sufficiently pervasive to constitute
hostile environment racial harassment. The Second Circuit disagreed,
concluding that the pervasiveness and severity of the alleged conduct warranted
a trial and could not be rejected as a matter of law.
On the question of the employer's liability, the Second Circuit assumed that
the Faragher/Burlington Industries defense was applicable to all situations of
supervisor harassment. "The Supreme Court recently held that an employer is
presumed absolutely liable in cases where the harassment is perpetrated by the
victim's supervisor, although employers may interpose an affirmative defense to
rebut that presumption." 50 The plaintiff's allegations included two incidents of
comments made by supervisors. Under the first prong of the affirmative defense,
the court considered whether the defendant had responded reasonably to the
plaintiff's complaints. Again, the court concluded that the issue was one for the
fact-finder at trial and could not be detennined on summary judgment. With
respect to the second prong of the defense, however, the court noted there was no
dispute "that Richardson took advantage of all avenues of complaint [the
employer] made available to her," thus refuting part two of the employer's
defense. 51
In Smith v. First Union National Bank,52 the Fourth Circuit similarly
reviewed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a case of reported
48. 180 F.3d426 (2d Cir. 1999).
49. The Supreme Court in Faragher noted that "Courts of Appeals in sexual harassment cases have
properly drawn on standards developed in cases involving racial harassment. Although racial and sexual
harassment will often take different forms, and standards may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is
good sense in seeking generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment."
Faragher 524 U.S. at 787 n. 1 (citation omitted). In Burlington Industries, the Court cited racial harassment and
sexual harassment cases interchangeably when discussing liability for co-worker harassment. 524 U.S. at 760
(citing Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 E2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991)). The lower courts appropriately have
applied the same liability standards to both claims. See, e.g., Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615 (5th Cir.
2000); Tutman v. WBBM-TV Inc., 209 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2000); Hafford v. Seidner, 167 F3d 1074 (6th Cir.
1999); Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
50. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 441.
51. Id. at 442-43.
52. 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
2001)
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
supervisor harassment. The plaintiff alleged a number of derogatory comments
made by her supervisor (Scroggins), including remarks that female employees,
when upset, must be "menstruating" or "needed a 'good banging,"' and "the
only way for a woman to get ahead at First Union was to spread her legs. 53 The
supervisor also threatened the plaintiff on several occasions. Ms. Smith reported
the harassment to the employer but ultimately was dissatisfied both with the
investigation and the employer's response to Mr. Scroggins' behavior.54 The
district court granted summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim
because the alleged conduct was not sufficient to constitute actionable
harassment or, alternatively, there was no liability for any harassment that did
occur.
55
After first concluding that Ms. Smith's allegations were adequate to warrant
a trial on the issue of whether hostile environment harassment had occurred, the
Fourth Circuit turned to the question of liability. Again, the court agreed a trial
was required (this time under the Faragher/Burlington Industries cases) to allow
a jury to consider the adequacy of the employer's policy and the reasonableness
of the employer's response once the conduct was reported 56 - both of which the
court assumed were relevant to prong one of the FaragherBurlington Industries
defense. The court recognized that the affirmative defense included two parts but
failed to provide any guidance to the trial court on how the second prong might
be satisfied in a case where the employee complained of the misconduct.
Given First Union's inadequate investigation, its failure to discuss or
even mention the topic of sexual harassment with Scoggins, and its
insistence on keeping Smith working in close proximity to Scoggins, a
jury could find that First Union did not act with reasonable care to
correct promptly Scoggins' harassing behavior. Because a dispute of fact
exists as to whether First Union exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly Scoggins' harassment of Smith, First Union cannot rely
on an affirmative defense to justify the district court's grant of summary
judgment. Accordingly, we decline to decide whether First Union proved
the second element of the Faragher-Ellereth test, which is whether Smith
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities by First Union.57
If applying Faragher/Burlington Industries, as the courts claim to be doing
in both Richardson and Smith, these facts arguably should have resulted in
53. Id. at 238-39.
54. As described by the court, First Union failed to investigate several of Ms. Smith's allegations and
also failed to characterize the complaint as one involving sexual harassment. As a consequence of this
"inadequate investigation," Mr. Scroggins was placed on probation and counseled to "improve his management
style and 'smile more."' Id. at 245-46.
55. Id. at 243-44.
56. Id. at 246-47. The conduct persisted for more than two years before Ms. Smith filed a formal
complaint, although Ms. Smith also alleged management discouraged her from using the grievance processes.
Id. at 239. Nonetheless, the issue of Ms. Smith's delay in reporting might be raised by the defendant as part of
prong two of the affirmative defense. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 246.
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summary judgment on liability for the plaintiff. Vicarious liability is imposed,
according to the Supreme Court unless both parts of the affirmative defense can
be established. Since the facts of the plaintiffs' internal reports were undisputed
in both cases - thus refuting the second prong of the defense - the courts
logically should have granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. Yet both the
Second and Fourth Circuits clearly assumed that liability would not be imposed
at trial if the employer met only prong one of the defense by proving it
"exercised reasonable care" in responding to the complaints of supervisor
misconduct. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to remand for trial on
that issue.58
The "one size fits all" approach of the Second and Fourth Circuits is not an
aberration. Other circuits have similarly failed to recognize any distinction in
vicarious liability (for unreported harassment) and direct liability (for reported
harassment). The Third, 59 Fifth,60 Sixth,61 Seventh,62 Eighth,63 and Ninth
Circuits64 all have applied the Faragher/Burlington Industries affirmative
defense to cases of reported supervisor hostile environment harassment.
Numerous district courts have followed suit.
65
58. Richardson, 180 F.3d at 442-43 ("We thus believe that reasonable jurors could disagree about
whether [the employer's] responses were so 'effectively remedial and prompt' as to shield [the employer] from
liability as a matter of law.... Accordingly, [the employer] was not entitled to summary judgment on the
question of employer liability for the hostile work environment at ACE We reverse the court's order granting
defendant's motion and remand with instructions to deny the motion.").
59. Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 117-20 (3d Cir. 1999) (analyzing the trial court's
jury instructions under the two prong affirmative defense in an action involving both supervisor and co-worker
harassment reported to the employer).
60. Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying affirmative defense to claims of
racial harassment where the harassment was reported and investigated).
61. Hafford v. Seidner, 167 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying affirmative defense to reported
racial harassment by supervisors). But see Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting a distinction between direct and derivative liability for racial harassment but ultimately applying
the two part affirmative defense of Burlington Industries to harassment known by the employer).
62. Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., 218 F.3d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying affirmative defense to reported
incidents of racial and sexual harassment).
63. Miller v. Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, Inc., 174 F.3d 948, 949 (8th Cir. 1999) (remanding case
to give defendant a chance to prove affirmative defense for supervisor sexual harassment, although plaintiff
alleged that the employer "knew or should have known" about the misconduct); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
175 F.3d 595, 597-98 (8th Cir. 1999) (assuming affirmative defense applies in case of reported supervisor
harassment).
64. Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861-63 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying affirmative defense to
reported supervisor harassment).
65. E.g., Lonergan v. Minolta Bus. Sys, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 511 (N.D. fI1. 1999) (dicta); Fall v.
Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1999); Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1240 (D. Kan.
1998) (dicta); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998); Sowemimo v.
D.A.O.R. Security, Inc., 43 F.Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Dewitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1254 (E.D. Okla. 1999); Brandrup v. Starkey, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Or. 1998); Glickstein v.
Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial Inc., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 601 (W.D. Va. 1998); Reinhold v. Virginia, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19532 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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B. Reporting Delays
In those cases applying the Faragher/Burlington Industries affirmative
defense to instances of reported harassment, some courts have avoided the
problem of applying the second part of the defense by focusing on the plaintiff's
alleged failure to make a prompt complaint under the employer's policy. Thus,
courts deem prong two of the defense satisfied by characterizing any delay in
reporting as an unreasonable failure to take advantage of the employer's
complaint process.
In Hill v. American General Finance,66 for example, the Seventh Circuit
considered claims involving both sexual and racial harassment. Shortly after she
began work, Ms. Hill's supervisor began making crude and suggestive
comments. On one occasion, he allegedly rubbed his pelvis against her buttocks,
stating, "Boy that feels good.",67 A few months after the harassment began, Ms.
Hill sent a letter to the company's chief executive officer complaining of the
supervisor's behavior towards customers, signing a customer's name to the letter.
A few days later, she wrote a second letter signed "a very worried and frightened
employee." 68 The Human Resources department conducted an investigation as a
result, but Ms. Hill still did not admit to being the author of the letter. Finally,
Ms. Hill wrote a third letter to the director of operations describing instances of
harassment and signing her name. Within three weeks, after a follow-up
investigation, the supervisor was transferred and demoted with a reduction in
69pay.
Under the Faragher/Burlington Industries standard, according to the
Seventh Circuit, American General Finance acted "in a flash" upon receipt of the
signed letter to investigate and correct the problem, thus meeting the first prong
of the affirmative defense.7° Two members of the panel also concluded that Ms.
Hill did not take advantage of the company's corrective opportunities under
prong two of the defense until she signed and sent her third letter - the delay
constituting an "unreasonable" failure to take advantage of the grievance process
available. Having met both parts of the affirmative defense on liability, the court
concluded, summary judgment for the employer was appropriate.
Similarly, in Watts v. Kroger Co.,71 the plaintiff ultimately reported the
harassment by her supervisor but waited several months to do so. According to
the plaintiff's allegations, the harassment began in March 1993 but intensified in
the spring of 1994. The plaintiff met with the store manager to complain in July
1994. The manager told the accused supervisor to stop his behavior, but did not
66. 218 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 641.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 642.
70. Id. at 643.
71. 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
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report the incident to the Human Resources Department. About two weeks later,
on July 19, 1994, the plaintiff also filed a union grievance claiming sexual
harassment. Kroger initiated no investigation until September. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the liability issue, based on
precedent predating the Supreme Court's 1998 decisions.
In addressing the Faragher/Burlington Industries standard before the Fifth
Circuit, Kroger argued that the plaintiff's delay in reporting amounted to an
unreasonable failure to take advantage of available complaint procedures under
the second prong of the affirmative defense.72 The circuit court remanded this
question for trial, finding a "genuine issue of material fact such that a reasonable
juror could decide against Kroger" on the question of whether the reporting
delay constituted an unreasonable failure on the part of the plaintiff to take
advantage of corrective opportunities.73 (Curiously, the court made no mention
of the first prong of the defense, although the manager did nothing to follow up
on the plaintiffs complaints after telling the supervisor to stop the behavior, and
the employer waited two months to begin an investigation after the report to the
store manager and the union grievance.)
74
In Montero v. Agco Corporation,75 the Ninth Circuit considered a case of
sexual harassment involving two supervisors and one co-worker. Plaintiff Carrie
Ann Montero was the only female employee in the company's Parts Division
Distribution Center. Plaintiff alleged a variety of offensive conduct and some
unwanted touching, beginning with the time that she was hired almost two years
earlier and ending approximately four months before she complained to the
Human Resources Manager. Within ten days of the complaint, the employer
investigated the allegations, fired one of the accused supervisors, and disciplined
the second supervisor and co-worker. Applying the Faragher/Burlington
Industries holding, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant
based on the employer's prompt response (satisfying prong one) and the
plaintiff's delay in reporting (satisfying prong two). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 76
But in Hill, Watts and Montero, the delay in reporting was beside the point.
The real issue at stake, as in Richardson, was how the employer responded once
the complaint was made. Neither a prompt nor postponed report should shield
the employer in Watts from liability if the employer's procrastination in initiating
an investigation could be considered "negligent" or "unreasonable" as a response
to Ms. Watts' complaints. In Hill and Montero, the court seemed determined to
reward the employer for its prompt investigation by rejecting liability and
72. Id. at 510.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 508, 510.
75. 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
76. Several district courts have followed a similar analysis in cases of reported harassment where the
plaintiff's delay in reporting is used to satisfy the second prong of Faragher/Burlington Industries. See, e.g.,
Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, 64 F. Supp.
2d 1067 (D.Kan. 1999); Chambers v. Wal-Mart Stores, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
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apparently was seeking a rationale to make the Faragher/Burlington Industries
defense "work" to reach the "right" answer. The issue of delay in reporting
added nothing to the analyses or the results. A simple negligence standard
applied in all three cases could have provided appropriate results using a much
more direct approach.
C. Vicarious and Direct Liability Divided
Only the Tenth, Eleventh and (sometimes) Fifth Circuits seem to distinguish
those situations of "direct" liability, where the employer was aware of the
harassment, and "vicarious" liability, where the employer had no knowledge of
the events in question. The issue perhaps has been most clearly articulated by the
Tenth Circuit. In the case of Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College,77 Ms. Wilson
promptly reported her supervisor's propositions and threats to the employer and
later won her case at trial. The employer appealed on the issue of whether it
should be absolved from liability for the supervisor's actions based on its
policies and appropriate handling of Ms. Wilson's complaint. In a note on the
applicable standard to be applied, the court stated:
In contrast to the vicarious liability claims addressed in [Faragher and
Burlington Industries], the only basis for employer liability that [the
plaintiff] raised below was a negligence theory. She alleged that TJC was
itself negligent because it knew or should have known of the harassing
conduct of Mr. Hall and failed to take appropriate action. The Supreme
Court recognized in Burlington and Faragher the continuing validity of
negligence as a separate basis for employer liability. Although many of
the same facts will be relevant to both negligence and vicarious liability
claims, in asserting that the employer was negligent the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the employer's conduct was unreasonable,
while in the misuse of authority claim the employer bears the burden of
establishing as a affirmative defense that it exercised reasonable care to
prevent the harassment.78
In the Eleventh Circuit case of Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services,
Inc.,79 the plaintiff was employed at a fire station and subjected to repeated
harassment by both her co-workers and her supervisors. The plaintiff alleged that
she complained frequently to her supervisor, but her supervisor was one of the
harassers and took no action. In addition, the plaintiff was threatened with
77. Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. Id. at 541, n.4 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). See also Wright-Simmon v. City of Oklahoma
City, 155 R3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998). Wright-Simmon was an action involving allegations of racial
harassment: The court referenced "employer negligence" as a basis for liability "not addressed in either
Burlington or Faragher," where the employer "knew, or should have known, about the hostile work
environment and failed to respond in an appropriate manner." Because the district court grant of summary
judgment had preceded the Burlington Industries and Faragher decisions, the appellate court remanded the
case for consideration of the new liability standard.
79. 168 E3d 417 (llthCir. 1999).
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retaliation if she took her complaints outside of the unit. When the plaintiff
eventually filed a grievance with the human resources department, the employer
immediately transferred her to another department and the harassers were fired
or disciplined. Based on these facts, the trial court granted summary judgment
for the employer because of the prompt remedial action taken once a formal
complaint was made.
80
In reviewing the applicable standard for employer liability under Faragher
and Burlington, the Eleventh Circuit noted the distinction between direct and
vicarious liability:
First, an employer can be held directly liable for a supervisor's
harassment when the employer either intended, or negligently permitted,
the tortious conduct to occur. The harassment can be ascribed to the
employer's negligence when the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take remedial action. Second, an
employer can be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual
harassment under any one of the following theories: (1) the supervisor
holds such a high position in the company that he could be considered
the employer's "alter ego"; (2) the harassment violates a nondelegable
duty of the employer; (3) the supervisor uses "apparent authority"
granted by the employer; or (4) the supervisor is aided in committing the
harassment by the existence of his agency relationship with the
employer.
8 1
The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment because of "an
issue of material fact" as to whether the employer had knowledge of the
harassment prior to the plaintiff's formal report to the Human Resources
Department.
82
Finally, at least one panel of the Fifth Circuit (in contrast to the Watts panel)
has addressed the direct/vicarious distinction as well. In Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc.,83 again involving a case of reported harassment, the court
explicitly acknowledged that the Faragher/Burlington holding did not address
the issue in question:
80. Id. at420-21.
81. Id. at 421-22 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 422. The plaintiff alleged two facts to support this conclusion. First, she claimed that an
employee in the human resources department, following the formal complaint, had commented to her that those
in the fire department were "up to their old tricks again." Id. at 423. Second, she alleged that another fire
department employee had told her he had made several complaints to the human resources department of the
harassment on her behalf prior to her own complaint. Id. at 422-23. Thus, the employer arguably could be
found liable for its failure to respond to earlier "knowledge" of the harassment.
83. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Ellerth and Faragher do not, however, directly speak to the circumstances
before us, a case in which the plaintiff quickly resorted to [the
employer's] policy and grievance procedure against sexual harassment,
and the employer took prompt remedial action. The Supreme Court cases
both involve complaints of longstanding supervisor misbehavior, and the
plaintiffs either never utilized or claimed not to be aware of the company
policies. But for purposes of imposing vicarious liability, a case
presenting only an incipient hostile environment corrected by prompt
remedial action should be distinct from a case in which a company was
never called upon to react to a supervisor's protracted or extremely
severe acts that created a hostile environment.
84
In furtherance of the policies underlying Faragher and Burlington Industries -
providing incentives to the employer to prevent and address harassment85 - the
Indest court nonetheless affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
The employer had established both prevention efforts (through an anti-
harassment policy) and correction efforts (through its prompt response to the
plaintiff's internally filed grievance).
D. Assessing Employer Knowledge
Under either a uniform standard for all employer liability questions for
supervisor hostile environment harassment or separate standards for vicarious
and direct liability, the question of employer knowledge is a significant threshold
inquiry. If separate standards are used, employer knowledge is critical in order to
determine which standard should be applied. If a uniform FaragherBurlington
Industries standard is applicable, lack of knowledge may be the employer's only
defense if no investigation or remedial efforts were attempted.
Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.,86 discussed earlier, is a good
example of the problem. When the plaintiff did file a formal complaint, her
employer immediately transferred her to another position, investigated the
allegations, and fired or disciplined the harassers. Such prompt and effective
action likely would satisfy the affirmative defense as applied by most of the
lower courts. There were additional allegations, however, that suggested the
human resources department was already aware of the harassment.87 If the
evidence substantiated those allegations, knowledge might be imputed to the
84. Id. at 265. See also Wright v. N.C. Dep't of Corrections, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8782, n. 16,
(M.D.N.C. 2000) ("Although the Supreme Court did not speak to this issue [of liability for reported
harassment] in Burlington Industries, we cannot conceive that an employer that satisfies the first element of the
affirmative defense and that promptly and adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment...
would be held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability to satisfy the literal terms of the second
element of the affirmative defense. Such a result would be wholly contrary to a laudable purpose behind
limitations on the employer liability identified by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries: to promote
conciliation.") (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 265-66.
86. 168 E3d 417 (11 th Cir. 1999). See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 82.
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employer prior to the formal complaint. If so, liability could be imposed for an
earlier failure to respond to known harassment.
The courts have had plenty of experience in evaluating whether the employer
knew or should have known about the misconduct in co-worker harassment
cases where employer knowledge has always been a prerequisite for liability.
88
For supervisor harassment, however, the knowledge issue has been muddled
since Faragher and Burlington Industries. The "early returns" since those
decisions suggest at least some disagreement among the circuits.
For some claims, the knowledge issue will be undisputed when the plaintiff
has filed a complaint under the employer's applicable grievance process. In other
cases, such as Dees, "knowledge" may be a question for the fact finder. For
example, the plaintiff may argue that the employer was aware of the conduct
because of the direct observations of management employees.89 Alternatively, if
the plaintiff failed to utilize a formal complaint process in place but did notify a
supervisor or manager, the parties may dispute whether such notification
constituted "knowledge" for the purpose of triggering the employer's obligation
to respond. In either case, a preliminary finding on the issue of "knowledge"
may be determinative. If knowledge is found, the fact-finder will focus primarily
or exclusively on the employer's response. If the employer has taken no action,
having relied on a "no knowledge" defense, liability should be imposed
(assuming the offending conduct is found to constitute "harassment" within the
meaning of the statute). If knowledge is lacking, the court's focus is limited
under Faragher/Burlington Industries to past efforts to prevent harassment,
usually in the form of a well-publicized anti-harassment policy.
Assume that the employer's sexual harassment policy has been widely
distributed and designates the Human Resources Department as the place to take
any complaints about sexual harassment in the workplace. The plaintiff fails to
file a formal complaint with the Human Resources Department, as required
under the employer's procedures, but does report the harassment to a supervisor.
The supervisor takes no action on the complaint and does not notify the HR
Department of the problem. If knowledge is not imputed to the employer in this
situation, and Faragher/Burlington Industries is deemed applicable, the plaintiff
loses because of her failure to utilize the complaint procedure available under the
second prong of the affirmative defense. If "knowledge" is found and the
employer failed to respond, however, the plaintiff should prevail - either because
the employer failed to correct the harassment under the first prong of the defense
(for those courts applying the Faragher/Burlington Industries defense even in
cases of reported harassment) or because of the employer's own negligence in
not addressing the complaint.
A similar fact situation was considered in Madray v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc.90 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that knowledge of the alleged harassment
88. See supra notes 21, 35-39 and accompanying text.
89. See e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999).
90. 208 F.3d 1290 (1lthCir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000).
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could not be imputed to the employer even though the plaintiff had reported
informally the misconduct to three mid-level managers. The court relied on
several factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the employer had a well-
publicized anti-harassment policy that clearly designated to whom complaints
should be made. Second, the managers to whom the plaintiff reported her
concerns were unaware of an ongoing pattern of behavior or any expectations on
the part of the plaintiff that they would take action to address the situation.
Finally, when the plaintiff ultimately did make a formal complaint pursuant to
the employer's procedures, the employer promptly investigated the allegations
and took appropriate action.91
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that a report of harassment to any
supervisor may be considered notice to the employer. In Wilson v. Tulsa Junior
College,92 the plaintiff worked on the night shift cleaning crew. One evening, her
supervisor Kenneth Hall exposed himself, requested oral sex, and told her he
could make her life "hell" if she refused. Returning home at the end of her shift
(at 1:00 a.m.), Ms. Wilson contacted the local police department and described
the incident. The next morning, a city police officer (who also worked part-time
for the campus police) reported to a campus police area supervisor that an
unknown "hysterical female" had claimed Mr. Hall had exposed himself to her.
93
The defendant in Wilson argued that the area supervisor was such a "low
level" supervisor that he could not be considered "the employer" for the purpose
of imputing knowledge of the harassment to the college. The Tenth Circuit
rejected this view:
"[A]ctual knowledge will be demonstrated in most cases where the
plaintiff has reported harassment to management-level employees." We
have further held that an employee who is a "low-level supervisor" may
also be a management-level employee for purposes of imputing
knowledge to the employer when he is [a] titled supervisor and has some
authority over other employees.
94
Indeed, the Wilson court went so far as to suggest that an anti-harassment
policy that did not require all supervisors to take some action on reported sexual
harassment would likely be considered inadequate to shield the employer from
liability. "A procedure that does not require a supervisor who has knowledge of
an incident of sexual harassment to report that information to those who are in a
position to take action falls short of that which might absolve an employer of
liability."95
91. Compare id. at 1293 with Breda v. Wolf Camera & Video, 222 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that
plaintiff's complaint to her manager was sufficient to establish employer knowledge where the employer's
policy specifically permitted reports to managers. The Court also found that plaintiff's failure to also contact
the personnel department did not defeat her claim that the employer was on notice of the harassment).
92. 164 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 537-38.
94. Id. at 542 (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998)).
95. Id. at 541-42 (citing Vamer v. Nat'l Super Mkts., 94 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 1996)).
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Other courts have rejected the need for formal reporting as well. In the
context of co-worker racial harassment in Jackson v. Quanex Corp.,9 6 the Sixth
Circuit criticized the lower court for requiring the plaintiff to follow formal
complaint procedures:
[N]owhere do the above delineated standards specify that the plaintiff, or
any other individual, must "report" the offensive conduct of co-workers
to the employer. Rather, to succeed, the plaintiff must establish that the
employer "knew or should have known" of the offenses. The case at
hand illustrates the relevance of this distinction, since, particularly as to
the slurs and racial graffiti presumably perpetrated by co-workers and
hostile to Jackson, it is important to observe that although Jackson
herself did not report every instance of what she saw to management,
other African-American employees testified that they did report them to
management .... Moreover, in cases such as this, where harassment is
pervasive, courts may impute constructive notice to an employer.
Employees testified that much of the offensive graffiti was in restrooms
commonly used by workers and supervisory foremen alike.97
Similarly, in Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department,98 the Third Circuit
rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was obligated to utilize five
available mechanisms for pursing her harassment complaint:
Hurley had no obligation to try all these mechanisms, because her
immediate supervisor, who was responsible for preventing and
redressing harassment pursuant to ACPD's own policy, was on notice of
the harassment. An employer cannot "use its own policies to insulate
itself form liability by placing an increased burden on a complainant to
provide notice beyond that required by law."99
An employer who has studied the implications of these decisions may design
his or her policy and implementation process quite differently, depending on the
circuit in which he or she happens to reside. Based on Madray, employers in the
Eleventh Circuit may be encouraged to "control" the issue of employer
knowledge by designating a complaint "gate-keeper" in their harassment policies
- requiring all complainants to go to a single individual or office. Employers in
the Eleventh Circuit, and perhaps the Third Circuit, also may be wise to avoid
any suggestion in the policy language that supervisors have an obligation to
96. 191 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 663 (citation omitted).
98. 174 F3d 95 (3rd Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 118. See also Watts v. Kroger, Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting employer's
argument that filing a union grievance, instead of filing a complaint under the employer's sexual harassment
policy, failed to satisfy prong two of the affirmative defense); Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 64
(2nd Cir. 1998) (plaintiff satisfied burden of employer "knowledge" of co-worker harassment by reports to her
direct supervisor; employer's policy explicitly stated that "an employer is considered to have direct knowledge
when an employee has complained directly to a supervisor"); Green v. Servicemaster Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1013-14 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (complaint to "lead" man and union steward may raises an issue of material fact as
to whether plaintiff had otherwise avoided harm under second prong of Faragher/Burlington Industries
affirmative defense) (dictum). Arguably, this case is distinguishable because the policy itself required all
supervisors to report any harassment complaints.
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report or prevent harassment. By contrast, an employer in the Tenth Circuit is
encouraged to place reporting responsibilities on all supervisors, presumably
requiring extensive communication and/or training efforts to ensure that even the
first level supervisors are aware of the obligation and can recognize possible
harassment complaints.
Perhaps the issue of reporting channels is not an "either/or" proposition. No
doubt there is a fine line for the employer between the "safe harbor" suggested
by Madray and the rejection of a place to "hide" suggested by Wilson. One
would be more inclined to recognize the "safe harbor" approach of Madray if the
employer could demonstrate extensive efforts to ensure all employees were
aware of where and how to complain. An employer reasonably could argue that
a centralized and well-trained human resources staff could better accomplish the
responsible and sensitive handling of such grievances. On the other hand, the
realities of the workplace make it far more likely that employees will present
their problems to a first-line supervisor rather than make a formal complaint to
human resources director. And the policy need not require the supervisor to
investigate or address the complaint; the supervisor's responsibility could end
with passing the information along to the HR specialists. Furthermore, if a report
made to any supervisor constitutes knowledge on the part of the employer, the
necessity for supervisor training and education about the company's policies
becomes far more compelling for the employer - thus serving the policies of
prevention articulated in Faragher and Burlington Industries.
100
E. Burdens of Proof and Summary Judgment
While the lower courts may be less than clear on their analytical approach to
liability for reported (or known) harassment, the FaragherBurlington Industries
Court left no confusion about who bears the burden of proof on the issue of
employer liability for unreported harassment. The defendant must establish the
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 1 Even in cases of
reported harassment, a similar approach may be warranted, and certainly has
been implicitly used by most of the circuits presented with the problem.
For cases tried before a jury, the burden shifting on liability may have
little practical impact. Whether the standard for reported harassment is
characterized as an issue of employer negligence in responding to the
complaint (with the burden of proof on the plaintiff) or the reasonableness of
the employer's response (with the burden of proof on the defendant), juries
likely would view the issue as one in the same. For the employer/defendant
who promptly investigates a claim of harassment and takes appropriate
remedial action, juries probably will find that the employer acted
"reasonably" or "not negligently" under either characterization.
100. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
101. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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At the summary judgment stage, however, one might expect the burden of
proof issue to have far more significance. In the traditional lore of summary
judgment, the texts and treatises assert that it is both difficult and rare for the
party carrying the burden of proof to move successfully for summary judgment.
We typically think in terms of summary judgment motions filed by the defendant
on claims for which the plaintiff (the non-moving party) carries the burden of
proof. As described in Moore ' Federal Practice:
Ordinarily, a party defending the case or claim is the party seeking
summary judgment and the party opposing summary judgment is a
plaintiff or counter or cross-claimant bearing the burden of persuasion on
the matter.... [S]ummary judgment for claimants is relatively rare, even
in cases controlled by the preponderance of the evidence standard,
because a movant who is also a claimant must do more than a defendant
because the burden of proof is placed on claimants rather than
defendants, a factor that often proves decisive even when the burden is
only the preponderance standard .... [T]he claimant movant must, even
when faced with only the preponderance burden of proof, establish a
right to summary judgment by showing that the pretrial record
demonstrates that the claimant movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law and that no reasonable factfmder at trial could fail to regard the
claimant as having discharged its preponderance of the evidence
burden. 102
Moore further mentions that the annotations for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 (governing summary judgment) list "few cases even discussing situations in
which the plaintiff obtained summary judgment." 
0 3
Given that a "reasonableness" standard is at stake (i.e., the
reasonableness of the employer's conduct in preventing and correcting
harassment), even fewer summary judgments may be warranted. In a different
context, the Supreme Court has noted that "the jury's unique competence in
applying the 'reasonable man' standard is thought ordinarily to preclude
summary judgment in negligence cases."'1 4 In the context of a sexual
harassment case, Judge Michael of the Fourth Circuit has expressed similar
reservations in a concurring opinion:
102. 3 JAMES WM. MooRE ETAL., MOORE'SFEDERALPRACTICE, 56.36-38 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 56.38. The treatise goes onto conclude that summary judgment under such circumstances is
"infrequent but not impossible." Id. at 56.90.
104. See TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1975) ("the jury's unique
competence in applying the 'reasonable man' standard is thought ordinarily to preclude summary judgment in
negligence cases."); Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983)("[Q]uestions
concerning the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, foreseeability and proximate cause particularly lend
themselves to decision by a jury."); Gross v. S. Ry., 414 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1969) ("issues of negligence,
contributory negligence and proximate cause, the resolution of which requires the determination of
reasonableness of the acts and conduct of the parties under all the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot
ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment.").
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I believe we are ill-advised to encourage the district court to consider, on
summary judgment, whether Southern has established the new Faragher-
Ellerth affirmative defense. I say this because the defense is especially
fact intensive ..... When the reasonableness of conduct is in question,
summary judgment is rarely appropriate because juries have "unique
competence in applying the reasonable person standard" to the facts of
the case. . . . If Faragher and Ellerth signal anything, it is that fewer
sexual harassment cases will be resolved on summary judgment. 105
With this backdrop, one would assume that the courts approach with caution
defendant summary judgment motions on the liability issue in supervisor hostile
environment harassment cases. Indeed, summary judgment for the plaintiff may
be more appropriate, as the party without the burden of proof on the issue. A
cursory review of cases decided since Faragher and Burlington Industries
refutes those assumptions, however. As discussed, many of these cases use the
Faragher/Burlington Industries affirmative defense for both "direct" liability
cases of reported harassment and "vicarious" liability cases of unreported
harassment. In both circumstances, summary judgment often is granted for the
defendant on the liability issue with little substantive discussion of the burden of
proof issue. 106
The courts generally acknowledge that the defendant must establish the
affirmative defense to avoid liability but rarely address the clearly higher burden
on the defendant as both the moving party and the party carrying the burden of
proof on the matter. Nor do the courts even suggest that summary judgment for
the plaintiff may be warranted, even when they explicitly conclude that the
defendant is unable to satisfy one of the prongs of the defense. Summary
judgment for the plaintiff on liability is simply nonexistent (although perhaps
even the idea of a plaintiff getting summary judgment on any issue in a Title VII
case is so foreign to experience that few plaintiff lawyers would even consider
filing such a motion).
107
105. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michael, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). The majority dismissed Judge Michael's concerns in a footnote, observing, "[W]e think this reads too
much into Faragher and Ellerth. Those cases in no way indicate that a variation from the normal requirements
of Rule 56 is appropriate of that grants of summary judgment will be infrequent." Id. at 182.
106. See, e.g., Seals v. Onondaga, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1858 (2nd Cir. 2000); Montero v. Agco Corp.,
192 E3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999); Meadows v. Tulare, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21083 (9th Cir. 1999); Hill v. Am.
Gen. Fin., 218 F3d 639 (7th Cir. 2000); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (E.D. Okla. 1999); Kohler v.
Inter-Tel Techs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5425 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Morris v. SEPTA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15830 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Riffle v. Sports Auth., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14588 (D. Md. 1999); Bishop v.
Interim Indus. Serv., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17350 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Marsicano v. Am. Soc'y of Safety
Eng'rs, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14314 (N.D. 111. 1998); Barua v. Credit Lyonnais-U. S. Branches, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20338 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (dicta).
107. Cf. Pacheco v. New Life Bakery, Inc., 187 E3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (judgment was entered
for the plaintiff on liability but only after the court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted a tangible
employment action - thus subjecting the employer to strict liability). But see Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist.,
259 F.3d 678, 699-70 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant, "as a matter of law," was "not entitled to
present an affirmative defense" to plaintiff's claim where the plaintiff filed an external complaint as permitted
under the defendant's policy, and the defendant did not conduct an investigation or take any remedial action
upon learning of the alleged harassment).
[Vol. 13: 133
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
In Hill v. American General Finance,08 for example, summary judgment
turned on the reasonableness of the employer's efforts to prevent and correct
harassment. As discussed earlier, 1°9 Ms. Hill accused her supervisor of making
crude remarks and initiating unwanted physical contacts. Ms. Hill complained of
the conduct in three letters sent to the employer but only signed her name to the
third one. An investigation followed and the supervisor was transferred and
demoted."' Applying Faragher/Burlington Industries, two members of the three
judge panel concluded that the company satisfied part one of the affirmative
defense by moving quickly to investigate and correct the problem.' 1 ' Under part
two of the defense, the majority found that Ms. Hill unreasonably had failed to
take advantage of the employer's complaint process by not identifyting herself
until the third letter. Thus, having met both prongs of the affirmative defense, the
employer was entitled to summary judgment.
In dissent, however, Judge Wood painted a very different picture of the
employer's commitment to the prevention of sexual harassment. Judge Wood
took issue with the court's finding on the first prong of the affirmative defense
because of arguable inadequacies in the company's policies. The employer had
pointed to three separate documents that purportedly combined to constitute the
defendant's anti-harassment policy. One merely stated that the company
complied with laws regarding equal employment. The second document
addressed sexual harassment explicitly but did little more than prohibit
harassment in general terms. The third document provided a generic complaint
procedure. What was lacking in the case, according to Judge Wood, was any
effort on the part of the employer to distribute or publicize these policies:
Hill claimed that she did not recall ever receiving those policies. AGF
did not try to refute this testimony by showing, as many employers do,
that Hill signed for receipt of the policies when she joined the company,
nor did it introduce evidence indicating when the policies were first
released to the workforce. It did not do this because, at least as the record
shows so far, that never happened. Instead, the best AGF could do was to
assert that the policies were buried in some notebooks that were
themselves located in a "public access area" and accessible to
employees.112
Judge Wood concluded that summary judgment would be inappropriate
under these circumstances. "Employees cannot be expected to go around
108. 218 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2000).
109. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
110. Hill, 218 F.3dat642.
111. Id. at 641-42.
112. Id. at 647 (Wood, J., dissenting). By comparison, the majority concluded, "While [the policies] may
leave room for improvement, the policies get the job done." Id. at 643. The Seventh Circuit's arguably
"minimalist" approach to prong one of the affirmative defense is in sharp contrast to the analysis of a district
court in Iowa. In Miller v. Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Iowa 2000) the court
indicated that an "effective anti-harassment policy" would include training for supervisors, an express anti-
retaliation provision, and multiple channels for reporting. The employer's sexual harassment policy contained
none of those safeguards and was judged inadequate to satisfy the first prong of the defense.
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opening up all sorts of unmarked binders, to see if by any chance they might
contain the company's harassment policy."
113
The facts in Hill, as described by Judge Wood are reminiscent of the facts in
Faragher - although the City of Boca Raton had a sexual harassment policy, no
effort was made to disseminate the policy to the lifeguards or their work areas.
On the other hand, Ms. Hill did know how to file a complaint (as evidenced by
the reports she actually made) and the company responded in some fashion each
time she did so. But the issue here is not whether Ms. Hill should win or lose on
this argument - rather, was the undisputed evidence of the employer's efforts to
"prevent" and "correct" harassment so compelling as to warrant judgment for the
defendant as a matter of law on an issue where the defendant carries the burden
of proof?
By comparison, the D.C. Circuit in Greene v. Dalton,114 in an opinion by
then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, refused to exonerate a defendant in spite of the
apparently prompt and serious sanctions imposed once a formal complaint was
lodged. The plaintiff, Luria Greene, sued the United Stated Navy for sexual
harassment by her immediate supervisor, Lieutenant Commander Donald
Clause. According to Ms. Greene, the harassment began on her first day of
employment in June, 1995 and culminated in rape on June 29. Ms. Greene
reported the alleged rape to the EEO counselor on August 2, and later filed a
formal complaint in October. As a result, court martial proceedings were
initiated and Clause eventually was convicted by a military court of adultery and
conduct unbecoming an officer. 115 Nonetheless, the district court granted
summary judgment for the Navy on liability.
In overturning the District Court's grant of summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals focused its discussion on the second prong of the Faragher/Burlington
Industries affirmative defense. The Navy argued that Ms. Greene's delay in
reporting the rape established her "unreasonable" failure to utilize the
employer's complaint process, thus satisfying part two of the defense. The
Circuit Court disagreed, holding that the Navy would be required to establish not
only Ms. Greene's unreasonable delay, but also that a reasonable person would
have come forward early enough to prevent the subsequent harassment. "A jury
may resolve both these issues in favor of the Navy, but without improperly
resolving disputed issues of fact, we cannot."'1 6 In conclusion, the Court further
noted that Ms. Greene's delay in reporting "is not causally related to the harm for
113. 218 F3d at 647 (Wood, J., dissenting). See also Williams v. Spartan Communications, Inc., No. 99-
1566, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5776 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 2000) (unpublished opinion) ("[W]hile the existence of
an antiharassment policy and prompt corrective action pursuant to it provides important evidence that an
employer has acted to meet the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, such evidence does not
compel this conclusion. Rather, any anti-harassment policy offered to satisfy the first prong of the defense must
be 'both reasonably designed and reasonably effectual."').
114. 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
115. Id. at 673. Clause admitted a sexual relationship with Ms. Greene but claimed the relationship was
consensual. To support his claim, he produced a diary allegedly written by Ms. Greene, as well as evidence of a
number of frivolous sexual harassment complaints filed by her in the past.
116. Id. at 675.
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which she is suing and hence does not preclude her recovery as a matter of
law.
,,117
Summary judgment also is granted routinely on liability in the more
"traditional" summary judgment situation involving co-worker harassment
cases, where the negligence standard clearly applies. Thus, the defendant is
moving for summary judgment on liability where the plaintiff carries the burden
of proof. Nonetheless, some courts seem to be going out of their way to protect
the employer as long as some response was made to the internal complaint.
Curry v. District of Columbia118 offers one example.
Curry involved harassment by a fellow officer in the city police department.
The plaintiff, Cynthia Curry, had ended a six-month intimate relationship with
her co-worker, Detective Condell Freeman. Approximately a year later, when
Ms. Curry was transferred back to Freeman's unit, Freeman began a campaign of
verbal harassment that lasted several months. Curry first reported the conduct to
her supervisor, who, in turn, referred the matter to the department's EEO officer.
The EEO officer began an immediate investigation, but the process took over
four months. The final report of the investigation found "probable cause" to
believe that sexual harassment had occurred. Although Freeman was verbally
admonished for the conduct (both before and after the investigation), no
disciplinary action was taken because the collective bargaining agreement and a
municipal ordinance prohibited disciplinary action more than 45 days after any
misconduct had occurred. 19
It was undisputed that the Department's investigation into Curry's complaint
took over four months, thus insuring that Freeman could not be disciplined
because of the 45-day rule. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded as a
matter of law that the employer "responded quickly and reasonably."' 120 In other
words, according to this court, no reasonable jury could have concluded that a
four-month investigation - by definition preventing any disciplinary action
regardless of the finding of the investigation - was less than a prompt and
effective response to Ms. Curry's complaint. The appellate court ruled that the
trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter
of law on this issue following the jury verdict.
121
117. Id. at 676. Under a more straightforward application of the Faragher/Burlington Industries dicta,
the delay in reporting would be irrelevant - rather, the issue would simply be one of "negligence" in evaluating
the Navy's response when the report was made. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
118. 195 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
119. Although Freeman's verbal harassment stopped in August, 1994 (when Curry stopped speaking to
him), Freeman allegedly continued to glare at Curry. Curry first complained of this behavior in November,
1995, but the department apparently concluded it was unable to act on this complaint because of the 45-day rule
that had previously been invoked. Id. at 658.
120. Id. at 661.
121. Id. The court also distinguished between the nonverbal harassment which occurred before and after
the plaintiff's complaint in November, 1995. Supra note 119. According to the court's reading of the relevant
precedent, the plaintiff could only recover for the nonverbal harassment after the complaint (due to the
department's inadequate response) but could not be held responsible for the harassment prior to the complaint.
Id. at 663.
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Equally questionable is the Eighth Circuit decision in Whitmore v. O'Connor
Management, Inc.122 The plaintiff in that case had been repeatedly harassed by
her co-worker in the maintenance department at a shopping mall. The
perpetrator, Mr. Bartee, hid in closets to catch Ms. Whitmore alone and
repeatedly touched her breasts and thighs. The harassment escalated and
included grabbing her neck, threatening to kill her, exposing himself, and
attempting to force her to perform fellatio. Ms. Whitmore reported these events
to mall management, as well as to the police. In the criminal action, Mr. Bartee
was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. In the meantime, another company
had assumed mall management. Both the general manager and the operations
manager of the new company (Mr. Hibben) were aware of the assaults, however.
Mr. Bartee continued to stalk Ms. Whitmore in the mall and refer to her as
his "prostitute.' 23 The operations manager was aware of these comments but
did not follow up on them or question Mr. Bartee, because it was "just hearsay",
and there was "no proof" In addition, Ms. Whitmore reported to Mr. Hibben a
confrontation and apparent threat by Mr. Bartee's sister. Mr. Hibben's response
was, "I thought all that stuff was over with between you and [Mr. Bartee]. 124 In
affirming summary judgment on liability for the defendant, the court of appeals
concluded:
The record does indeed amply demonstrate that General Growth was on
notice of the outrageous and deplorable conduct on Mr. Bartee's part that
occurred before General Growth took over management of the mall....
The fact, if it is one, that Mr. Hibben knew that Mr. Bartee's sister had
threatened Ms. Whitmore in some unspecified way, is hardly sufficient to
put General Growth on notice that Mr. Bartee had continued to harass
Ms. Whitmore sexually. The same can be said of Mr. Hibben's testimony
that he knew that Mr. Bartee was defaming Ms. Whitmore .... We note
that General Growth prohibited Mr. Bartee from going within view of
Ms. Whitmore immediately after she filed an EEOC charge complaining
about his activities. In other words, an explicit communication to General
Growth's management of Ms. Whitmore's complaints brought a prompt
and appropriate remedial response. 125
While Mr. Hibben's casual response to Ms. Whitmore's situation might have
seemed appropriate absent the extensive history involved, one could certainly
argue that a reasonable jury might find his reaction inadequate and unreasonable
under these particular circumstances. 1
26
122. 156 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1998).
123. Id. at 798.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 800.
126. In applying the negligence standard for co-worker harassment, other courts have been willing to
split the negligence "hair" between not responding at all and responding but in a negligent manner - holding
the employer liable only in the former situation. "Once an employer is aware of and responds to charges of
sexual harassment ...mere negligence as to the content of the response cannot be enough to make the
employer liable." Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
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The frequent grant of summary judgment for employers on liability in co-
worker harassment cases, where the plaintiff carries the burden of proof, may be
somewhat more defensible. These results are harder to justify in supervisor
harassment cases, however, where an affirmative defense is in question. The
willingness of the lower courts to grant summary judgment to employers on an
issue on which they carry the burden of proof - sometimes based on only
minimal efforts by the employer to prevent or correct the harassment - may
suggest a fundamental resistance by the courts to accept any employer liability in
this area. 27
III. THE EMPLOYER AS PART OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Employer as Part of the Problem: Defining the Liability Standard for
Reported Supervisor Harassment
If the Supreme Court has suggested two different standards for liability
depending on employer knowledge - negligence for direct liability involving
known harassment and the affirmative defense for vicarious liability for
unknown harassment - are these two approaches mutually exclusive? In other
words, can only one theory of liability be applied in a given case depending on
whether the employer had knowledge of the harassment or is the plaintiff free to
use either or both? On the one hand, the issue of "vicarious" liability arguably
evaporates once the employer is notified of the alleged harassment. With
knowledge, the employer must either implicitly affirm the harassment (by taking
no or inadequate action in response) or repudiate it (by investigating and
disciplining the perpetrator).128 Either way, the analysis and focus shift to the
employer's own behavior in response to misconduct deemed by the Supreme
Court as outside the scope of employment.
129
U.S. 1110 (1998), quoted with approval in Boykin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
7283 (6th Cir. 2000).
127. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000), arguably offers some hope for plaintiffs on the summary judgment front. The case involved neither
sexual harassment nor employer liability issues but may suggest a more general admonition by the Supreme
Court concerning the availability of summary judgment. Reeves addressed the summary judgment standard in
the context of age discrimination allegations under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
621 et seq. (2001). Although not directly relevant to the liability question under discussion here, the Court's
holding and recital of traditional summary judgment tenets (reinforcing the general principles of Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and its progeny) may signal caution to the lower courts in the consideration of
summary judgment in employment discrimination claims. "[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. [Citation
omitted.] 'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
form the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.' (Citation omitted.] Thus, although the court should
review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not
required to believe." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-5 1.
128. Cf Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Where the company, on
hearing a plaintiff's complaint about inappropriate sexual behavior, moves promptly to investigate and stop the
harassment, it eradicates any semblance of authority the harasser might otherwise have possessed.").
129. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 at 757 ("The general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.").
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The Faragher/Burlington Industries affirmative defense is clearly misplaced
when the plaintiff has promptly complained of the offending conduct to the
employer. Under a literal application, the defendant would be unable to establish
the second prong of the affirmative defense - the plaintiff's unreasonable failure
to take advantage of the complaint procedure offered. Consequently, since the
employer could not satisfy both parts of the defense, liability should be imposed.
But the Court never intended to apply strict liability in hostile environment cases
where the misconduct was reported and remedied; indeed, the application of
strict liability was explicitly rejected in Meritor Savings.130 Such a result also
directly contradicts the Court's policy rationale of prevention by failing to
encourage anti-harassment policies, reporting, and internal resolution.
131
The lower courts have managed to avoid this logical but unsupportable
conclusion, but only by manipulating or partially ignoring the affirmative
defense to address a situation it was never intended to cover. Some courts have
simply ignored the second prong altogether if the employer acted responsively to
the reported harassment under prong one. Other courts, clearly uncomfortable
with examining only one part of a clearly articulated two-part test, have turned
the focus and blame on the employee. Thus, the courts use the employee's delay
in reporting to get past the second prong, thus reaching the desired result: An
employer will not be found liable for the harassment as long as he responds
appropriately once the misconduct is reported. Surely neither approach can be
satisfying for the courts or the litigants. Another solution is needed;
Faragher/Burlington Industries simply does not fit.
Perhaps the Court did not mean to suggest that negligence is the only means
of imposing liability for reported harassment, although it would seem more than
a little odd (if not completely unmanageable) to have two liability standards in
play that may lead to different results. Consider an employer who has no sexual
harassment policy or complaint procedure in place and has done nothing to
address this potential problem in the workplace. Nonetheless, when an employee
reports harassment to management, the employer immediately separates the
parties, investigates the allegations, and promptly imposes serious sanctions
against the harasser (e.g., firing the harasser or removing him from a supervisory
position). Applying the negligence standard articulated by the Supreme Court -
"An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should
have know about the conduct and failed to stop it"1 32 - the claim should fail. The
employer cannot be labeled as "negligent" in his behavior in the face of a known
complaint.
Yet one could argue for a less literal reading of the Court's language and a
broader interpretation of "negligence" theory in these circumstances. The
employer's failure to "prevent" the harassment (e.g., by the creation and
dissemination of an anti-harassment policy, related training, etc.) also could be
130. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
131. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06.
132. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 759.
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considered "negligent," even though he acted quickly to correct the specific
complaint. 133 Had such a policy been in place, the harassment and the harm
might never have occurred. In other words, negligence is established by the
employer's failure to at least attempt harassment prevention by establishing an
effective anti-harassment policy. Under this analysis, the plaintiff wins on the
liability question, in spite of the employer's response to the complaint. The
Faragher/Burlington Industries defense would presumably yield the same result.
The employer would be unable to present any evidence on that part of the first
prong that considers efforts to "prevent" harassment. Further, the second prong
could not be met both because there was no procedure in place to follow and
because a report was actually made. Thus the defense fails and the plaintiff
succeeds, at least on liability.
From a policy perspective, there are at least two competing views from
which to evaluate liability for the employer who has no anti-harassment policy
but responds appropriately when a complaint is made. Should our primary goal
be rewarding the employer for his appropriate response to the harm in question,
thus encouraging the same behavior by other employers in the future?
Alternatively, are we more concerned with punishing this employer for his past
derelict behavior in preventing harassment, which may have created or
contributed to an atmosphere that permitted the harassment to occur at all? If our
primary concern is to reward employers for prompt action when presented with a
complaint, then the courts should apply the more limited negligence analysis
above that absolves the employer from liability. While this result arguably
provides no prevention incentives for the employer, recall that only reported
harassment is at issue here. The risk of liability for unreported harassment (that
is, the clear incentive to establish and enforce anti-harassment policies under
Faragher/Burlington Industries for cases of vicarious liability) should prove
sufficient to address that problem.
If we are more concerned with the goal of prevention, then the treatment of
liability should punish the employer for his failure to establish an anti-
harassment policy regardless of his commendable efforts to address a specific
complaint. If this is our goal, a broader conception of negligence might be
appropriate to provide a double incentive to put anti-harassment policies in place
even if the employer cannot be faulted for his response to the plaintiff's
complaint. An employer without a policy thus would be strictly liable for any
actionable harassment. Nonetheless, incentives remain for the employer without
a policy to redress specific grievances. An employer's prompt efforts to remedy
the problem may stop inappropriate behavior before it reaches the level of
actionable harassment within the meaning of the statute, may limit possible
133. The focus of the Court in the circumstances of Faragher and Burlington Industries (i.e., on
vicarious liability for unknown harassment rather than negligence for the employer's response to a complaint)
was solely on the prevention of harassment prior to the incident(s) in question, not on the prevention of future
harassment of the victim in question, since the employer was unaware there even was a victim.
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damages for any harassment that has occurred, 134 or may convince the employee
not to sue at all.
A more troubling consequence of the different standards for liability
(negligence for direct liability and the FaragheriBurlington Industries defense
for vicarious liability) may be the implications of creating or applying a
distinction that results in different burdens of proof. The burden of proof for
liability is placed squarely on the employer for unknown harassment under
Faragher and Burlington Industries but presumably remains with the plaintiff
under a negligence analysis. Why should the plaintiff retain a higher burden of
proof when she reports the harassment (thus acting as the Supreme Court hopes
to encourage 135) than when she fails to do so? Conversely, why should the
employer be subjected to a higher standard of proof when the harassment is
unknown to him than when the harassment has been reported? It seems
backward.
One "quick fix" to the problem of dual standards might be to shift the burden
of proof in cases of known harassment, while reformulating the
Faragher/Burlington Industries defense to match the changed circumstances. If
the plaintiff reports the harassment, the employer is liable unless it can establish
as an affirmative defense that it responded to the complaint reasonably and
appropriately. This analysis would parallel the Court's holding in Faragher and
Burlington Industries and offer some symmetry and consistency. And, in fact,
this approach is, in essence, the one taken by most of the lower courts, although
it is often articulated as applying the two prong FaragherBurlington Industries
affirmative defense.
An alternative articulation of the modified Faragher/Burlington Industries
defense for known harassment might include past acts as well - in other words,
this affirmative defense would also consist of two prongs, part one considering
the employer's actions to "prevent" harassment in the past (through a policy,
training, etc.) and part two considering the employer's efforts to "correct" the
reported harassment in question. Such an expanded version would impose
liability, for example, for an employer without an anti-harassment policy who
nonetheless investigated and corrected an internal grievance. Without the
prevention prong, the employer might be absolved of liability based on his
prompt response. With the prevention prong, the employer's past inaction would
still provide a basis for liability.
Adopting an affirmative defense approach should also impact - at least in
theory - the availability of summary judgment on the liability question. As
discussed, the employer should have a harder time obtaining summary judgment
on an issue for which it carries the burden of proof. Thus, one would anticipate
134. For example, prompt remedial efforts likely would limit the extent (both in time and severity) of the
harassment and avoid an assessment of punitive damages under the standards of Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
135. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 764 ("To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage
employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VIl's
deterrent purpose.").
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more frequent summary judgments on liability for the defendant under a
negligence standard than under the reformulated affirmative defense. The
Faragher/Burlington Industries Court gave no hint as to whether it anticipated
or intended such a consequence.
Thus, for analyzing supervisor harassment reported or otherwise known to
the employer, four approaches seem feasible within the broad parameters of
Faragher/Burlington Industries and its progeny.136 Under two of these
approaches, the burden of proof on liability would remain with the plaintiff. The
other alternatives would shift the burden of proof to the employer, parallel to the
Faragher/Burlington Industries defense.
First, consistent with the position taken by the Tenth Circuit, 137 the courts
could apply Faragher/Burlington Industries as written. A negligence standard
would be used for liability focusing solely on the employer's response to the
alleged harassment, with the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Second, the courts could apply essentially the same standard, focusing solely
on the employer's efforts to "correct" reported harassment, but place the burden
of proof on the defendant. This would consistently place the burden on liability
on the employer in all supervisor harassment cases, regardless of employer
knowledge.
Third, the lower courts could apply an expanded negligence standard to
instances of known harassment, including examinations of both pre-complaint
prevention and post-complaint correction. This two-part analysis would be
consistent with the Court's policy concerns, although arguably inconsistent with
the Court's literal language. As a "negligence standard," the burden of proof on
liability would remain with the plaintiff.
Fourth, the courts could expand Faragher and Burlington Industries to
create a comparable, two prong affirmative defense in cases of known
harassment, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Part one would ask
whether the employer has acted in the past to prevent harassment; part two
would ask whether the employer acted promptly and appropriately to correct the
harassment of the plaintiff once it was known to management.
Which is the correct standard? In some situations, all of the approaches
would result in the same conclusion. An employer who failed to respond to
known or reported harassment should be found liable under each of the four
standards. At the opposite end of the continuum, an employer with an anti-
harassment policy who acts appropriately to correct reported misconduct should
be absolved under any of these theories. Finally, an employer who has acted in
the past to prevent harassment but fails to respond to a reported complaint in the
particular instance that forms the basis for the current claim should also be found
136. Under any of these theories, the courts would first need to determine as a preliminary matter that the
employer did, in fact, have knowledge of the harassment. The knowledge determination would, in turn, clarify
whether the case is one of vicarious or direct liability.
137. See Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Coll., 164 F.3d 536, 541 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998), discussed supra at notes
77-78.
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liable using any of the approaches. The only scenario in which the result may
differ is when the employer has acted to correct the reported harassment at issue
but has made no (or inadequate) past efforts to prevent the behavior. In this last
situation, only the more narrow analyses under options one and two would avoid
liability.
If one returns to the Court's policy discussions in Faragher and Burlington
Industries, the argument for an expanded liability analysis that includes
"prevention" as well as correction (options three and four) may be more
compelling. As noted earlier, the Court's justifications included incentives to
develop harassment policies with complaint procedures, to promote internal
resolution, and to encourage prompt reporting by victims of harassment. 138
Indeed, the Court stated in Faragher that the statute's "'primary objective'...
[was] not to provide redress but to avoid harm.' 39 If this statement is taken at
face value, the prevention incentive seems a necessary part of any approach
selected. Adding the "prevention" element to the employer's defense even in the
case of reported harassment would further these principles.
140
Including "prevention" as part of the liability standard for sexual harassment
effectively would impose strict liability for the employer with no anti-
harassment policy or grievance procedure in place. Would the Court go so far,
even for the hypothetical employer without an anti-harassment policy who
nonetheless responded in a model fashion as soon as the complaint was made?
The employer might argue "no harm, no foul" if the report were made
immediately after the offending conduct - that is, a policy would have speeded
neither the complaint nor the response. But the plaintiff could contend that the
harassment might never have occurred had the employer implemented and
distributed an anti-harassment policy.
Accepting the principle of prevention as critical to the Court's policy
approach, options three and four are the only acceptable alternatives - the
distinction between the two being the assignment of the burden of proof. As
noted, in "true" vicarious liability cases in which the harassment is unknown to
the employer, the defendant must sustain the burden on the affirmative defense
to avoid liability. Under a negligence approach in direct liability cases in which
the harassment was reported or otherwise known to the employer, the plaintiff
retains the burden on liability to establish the defendant's negligence. If the
Supreme Court indeed intended to retain a negligence standard for sexual
harassment claims reported to the employer, we are left with the anomaly that
the burden of proof on liability shifts depending on whether or not the employer
had knowledge of supervisor harassment.
138. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 764.
139. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 773 at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405,417 (1997)) (emphasis added).
140. Some courts have added the "prevention" element to the liability standard for co-worker
harassment, as well. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 767 (2d Cir. 1998) (articulating as the
liability standard for co-worker harassment that the employer failed to respond to known harassment or "failed
to provide a reasonable complaint procedure").
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The fourth option - a reformulated affirmative defense shifting the burden of
proof to the employer/defendant for reported harassment and including elements
of both "prevention" in the past and "correction" of the reported conduct - has
much to commend it. It offers an approach closely parallel to the Court's
treatment of liability for unreported harassment in Faragher and Burlington
Industries, it addresses the policy concerns expressed by the Court, and it
consistently imposes the burden of proof on liability on the employer in all
supervisor hostile environment cases. The only real problem with this extension
of Faragher/Burlington Industries seems to be the Court's contradictory
suggestion that negligence is the appropriate standard. "[A]lthough a
supervisor's sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment because the
conduct was for personal motive, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where
its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with
respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct
and failed to stop it."'14 1 Did the Court really "mean it," or were these ill-
considered remarks without sufficient focus on the full implications of this
approach?
The Court certainly had the opportunity to consider a broader application of
the affirmative defense and indicated no reluctance to discuss liability standards
for other types of sexual harassment claims. In the context of its discussion,
described earlier at length, the Court used careful and deliberate language; its
reference to negligence liability for harassment known to the employer is hard to
dismiss as an offhand remark. The shifting of the burden of proof is - or should
be - a significant decision not to be undertaken lightly. As suggested by the
Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court's analysis in Faragher and Burlington
Industries seems to retain the negligence standard for harassment known to the
employer.
None of the options are completely satisfactory. While option four may be
the most defensible alternative from a policy perspective, one cannot ignore the
Supreme Court's quite comprehensive discussion of liability issues in Faragher
and Burlington Industries; one would have expected some indication from the
Court if it intended an affirmative defense for reported harassment cases as well.
Nor can one be confident that the Court would adopt the two-part defense
(prevention plus correction) to impose strict liability for all employers without an
effective anti-harassment policy, regardless of how exemplary the employer may
have acted in responding to a complaint. But option four seems the only logical
conclusion to both promote the prevention concerns spotlighted by the Court and
avoid the uncomfortable anomaly of shifting burdens of proof.
141. Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 759. Furthermore, the two circuits that clearly have recognized
the direct/vicarious liability distinction have both assumed that a negligence standard is applicable in cases of
reported harassment. See Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 421 (11th Cir. 1999)
("The harassment can be ascribed to the employer's negligence when the employer knew or should have know
about the harassment and failed to take remedial action."); Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155
E3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) ("employer negligence" is liability standard where the employer "knew, or
should have known, about the hostile environment and failed to respond in an appropriate manner").
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B. The Employer As Part of the Solution: Meeting the "Primary Objective"
If one is to take heed of the Supreme Court's overriding interest in
prevention - as Title VII's "primary objective"'142 - in fashioning a set of rules to
govern employer liability for sexual harassment, the answers to these layered
questions more easily fall into place. First, in addressing the threshold issue of
knowledge, notice to any supervisory employee should be sufficient to impute
knowledge to the employer. Second, liability for reported supervisor harassment
should be subject to a two-part inquiry examining both the employer's past
efforts to prevent harassment and the employer's current efforts to address the
reported misconduct. Third, the employer's defense should operate as an
affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the employer. Finally, summary
judgment on liability must be closely scrutinized by the courts within the context
of the applicable burden of proof, resulting in far fewer judgments for the
employer and far more for the plaintiff.
The issue of "knowledge" remains a key question regardless of which
standard is used in assessing employer liability. For the employer who has done
nothing to correct supervisor harassment, the employer's lack of knowledge
provides the only possibility for avoiding liability. 43 The employer cannot be
expected to correct misconduct about which he knows nothing. In addressing the
question of knowledge, courts should resist the implication of Madray144 that
employers may be able to isolate themselves from knowledge of harassment by
insisting on a single, formal reporting channel. Victims of sexual harassment
often are reluctant to report at all, 145 particularly when the perpetrator is a
supervisor; any additional barriers erected by the employer will serve only to
dissuade them further.
In the reality of the workplace, an employee is far more likely to mention her
complaint to a low-level (and thus less intimidating) supervisor or manager than
to file a formal grievance with the human relations director. An employer need
not expect all of his supervisors to address the complaint; the supervisor need
only pass along the information to someone in the company designated, and
appropriately trained, to deal with the problem. Imputing knowledge based on a
complaint to any supervisor may motivate the employer to disseminate its policy,
if not provide training, to all supervisors so that this reporting obligation is
known and understood. But such an incentive should only increase the
142. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417 (1975)).
143. Where the employer succeeds in establishing its lack of knowledge, liability may still be imposed
under Faragher and Burlington Industries, but a finding of knowledge should result in clear liability where the
employer has done nothing to correct the problem.
144. Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000), discussed supra at notes 90-
91 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment: The Inside Story, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at
47-48 (survey of 9,680 readers reported that over 60% of the respondents had been harassed, but only one in
four reported the conduct to their employer).
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possibility that the harassment will not occur at all or at least will be "caught" at
an early stage - both in support of Title VII's prevention and correction goals.
With respect to the liability standard, a two-part affirmative defense that
parallels the Supreme Court's approach in Faragher and Burlington Industries
again has the best chance of prompting the employer to focus on early
preventions and cures rather than after-the-fact defenses. Under part one, a court
would examine the employer's past efforts at prevention. In general, an
employer without an anti-harassment policy would be unable to meet this burden
and thus would become strictly liable for any harassment that occurred. Under
part two, the court would consider the adequacy of the employer's response to
the reported claim. Again, strict liability should be imposed for any employer
who failed to respond at all to a complaint of harassment.
The issue of employee delay in reporting becomes largely irrelevant under
this standard of assessing liability, although it may well be relevant on the
damage question. Rather than suggesting the plaintiff should be "blamed" or
"punished" for a delay in reporting, the delay merely postpones the employer's
obligation to respond to the harassment. Until the report is made, no duty to
correct is triggered. If the employer then acts promptly to address the complaint,
and there are other past efforts to prevent the harassment from occurring (e.g., an
anti-harassment policy), liability should be avoided altogether. 146 If the employer
fails to respond to the report of harassment or responds inadequately, liability
should be imposed. The plaintiff's delay in reporting might result in more
limited damages, however, if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to report the
misconduct at an earlier point in time that would have avoided some of the
harm. 147 But no such relief should be available if the employer is unable to
satisfy part one of the defense by demonstrating past prevention efforts.
In spite of the Court's apparent suggestion to the contrary, the burden of
proof on this defense must rest with the employer. Incentives to correct ongoing
harassment are no less important than incentives to prevent the misconduct in the
first place. Placing this heightened responsibility on the employer will further
enhance those incentives, as well as avoid the confusion of shifting the burden of
proof in cases of known and unknown harassment.
C. Reassessing Summary Judgment
Finally, with respect to the question of summary judgment, the defendants'
surprising success rate on the liability affirmative defense deserves closer
scrutiny. Why the reluctance to hold employers' responsible for the
146. If the employer is responsible for the delay, however (e.g., by discouraging the plaintiff from filing
an internal complaint) the employer should be held responsible for the harassment because of his inadequate
prevention efforts underpart one of the affirmative defense. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d
234 (4 Cir. 2000), discussed supra at notes 52-57.
147. Cf Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 764 ("Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable
consequences doctrine, and the considerations which animate that doctrine would also support the limitation of
employer liability in certain circumstances.") (citations omitted).
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discriminatory acts of their supervisors? While examining the underlying factors
that may explain this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, several
possibilities come to mind.
One possibility is that the premise is wrong: defendants are not, in fact,
winning summary judgment motions on liability at a significant rate; rather we
are only reading about the grants, not the denials. Published judicial opinions
simply may fail to provide an unbiased sampling - the denial of summary
judgment motions are far less likely to result in significant opinions at the trial
court level selected for publication. Furthermore, summary judgment typically
ends the case and provides grounds for immediate appeal, and hence an
opportunity for an appellate decision that is also more likely to be published. In
contrast, a summary judgment denial does not constitute a fmal order subject to
immediate appeal. Once the case has proceeded to a trial on the merits, the
earlier denial of summary judgment is far less likely to be included in any
appeal. 148 Consequently, as a practical matter, we are only accessing in the
federal court reporters those cases where summary judgment has been granted.
These cases may represent only a fraction of the cases in which summary
judgment has been sought, yet there is no readily available record of these
decisions. 49 It may well be that defendants are losing the vast majority of such
motions.
Yet another possible explanation is that claims involving reported harassment
may be less likely to involve factual disputes about the employer's response to
sexual harassment complaints. Courts routinely deny summary judgment where
the parties dispute a "material fact" but are accustomed to granting summary
judgments where the facts are uncontested - suggesting only an "issue of law"
remains. If the parties are in agreement about the employer's actions following
the complaint, the courts may consider such cases appropriate for summary
judgment. Nonetheless, even in the absence of a factual dispute, the plaintiff may
legitimately dispute the "reasonableness" of the employer's actions. As
illustrated above in Cury 150 and Whitmore,151 the question of whether the
response was "reasonable" under the circumstances should present a jury issue
even when the parties largely agree on the "facts."
Perhaps summary judgments on affirmative defenses are resolved
"differently" in some way than the more classic circumstance of summary
148. The reasons for this are both practical and strategic. If the defendant wins at trial, the defendant
would have no grounds for an appeal. Should the plaintiff appeal, the legal arguments supporting the trial
victory are likely to be far stronger and more convincing than an argument about the higher thresholds of
summary judgment. Should the defendant lose at trial, the summary judgment argument may make more sense,
yet it seems awkward at best to argue no "reasonable" fact-finder could find against you when the fact-finder
did just that at trial.
149. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by
Winning, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869, 882-83 (1999) ("Judges may be more inclined to publish opinions
granting summary judgment, to either party, than opinions denying summary judgment because they believe
that a decision that resolves the dispute is more significant, and thus precedent-worthy, decision."); 884-85
([T]he largest category of appealable trial court decisions is likely to be orders granting summary judgment.").
150. See supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text
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judgment motions filed by defendants where the moving party does not have the
burden of proof on the underlying claim. The courts' treatment of such motions
may not fit the standard "hornbook" law in this area. Although I am unaware of
any other area of law in which defendants are successfully pursuing summary
judgment on affirmative defenses, further research may suggest the difference in
treatment is not unique to the sexual harassment area.
Other, less benign, explanations also come to mind. Perhaps these results are
part of a broader trend of granting summary judgment in employment
discrimination claims in general and sexual harassment claims in particular.
Certainly some commentators have argued that the lower courts have been
unusually hostile to employment discrimination claims. 152 If this perceived
resistance to employment discrimination claims exists, the results here could be
a subset of that larger problem.
Yet underlying these possibilities remains a disturbing suspicion that many
lower courts are particularly resistant to sexual harassment claims in particular -
a resistance that often manifests itself in the courts' response to the liability
question. Beginning with the premise endorsed by the Supreme Court that
harassment is conduct outside the "scope of employment," perhaps the courts
fmd it unfair to impose liability unless the culpability of the employer is clear. If
so, the courts' perspective is fundamentally at odds with the liability regime
152. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in ltle Vll and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C.L. REv. 203 (1993); B. GLENN GEORGE, IF YOU'RE
NOT PART OF THE SOLUTION, YOU'RE PART OF THE PROBLEM: EMPLOYER LIABIITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 13
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM [PAGE?] (2001/2?)
Sexual harassment claims already include a more demanding prima facie case than other types of
discrimination claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A claim that the plaintiff
was refused a promotion because of his race requires at the pleading stage only the minimal allegations that the
plaintiff is a member of a protected class, he applied and was qualified for the position, the employer rejected
him, and the employer continued to seek other applicants. Id. at 802. By contrast, a plaintiff seeking to state a
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment must establish that the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class, the offending conduct was unwelcome, the harassment was based on the plaintiff's protected status, and
the conduct both objectively and subjectively is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). See generally B. Glenn George, The Back Door, supra
note 5 (discussing the more burdensome prima facie case for harassment cases as compared to other types of
discrimination claims under Title VII); The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, Gender and Employment Law 67 S. CAL. L, REV. 745, 884 (1994)
("[F]ederal district judges are widely perceived to be less receptive to employment discrimination cases of all
types than they are to commercial cases with high monetary stakes.").
Some courts, however, continue to articulate a particular need for caution in employment discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Because discrimination
cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence, we are particularly deferential to the
nonmovant."); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2nd Cir. 1994) (finding that
"additional considerations should be taken into account" in granting summary judgment to an employer in a
discrimination case when "intent is at issue"); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8" Cir. 1994)
(declaring that "summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases"); Green v.
Servicemaster Co., 66 F.Supp. 2d 1003, 1006-07 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (citing Crawford's warning agains the use
of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases); Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 366, 369
(D.Conn. 1999) (citing the Second Circuit's warning to district courts in Gallo to exercise caution summary
judgment in employment discrimination cases).
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created by the Court. Liability is the presumption rather than another hurdle for
the plaintiff to jump.
Harassment cases are the only cases in Title VII law that treat liability as an
issue to be litigated separately from the underlying discrimination claim. And
only in sexual harassment cases has the Supreme Court chosen to place the
liability burden of proof on the defendant. In such cases - certainly for vicarious
liability for unknown harassment, and perhaps for liability for reported
harassment as well - the courts should proceed with care and deliberation,
acknowledging the added burden on the defendant to establish the defense. That
burden should permit plaintiffs more opportunities to proceed to trial, if not win
partial summary judgments of their own.
The problem is not one of changing the law but of adhering to well-
established legal principles. Defendants face a double hurdle in seeking
summary judgment on liability in both carrying the burden of persuasion on the
issue and arguing under a reasonableness standard. In many cases, those barriers
should combine to deny the summary judgment. Any questions about past
prevention efforts or the speed or extent of the employer's response generally
should be left to the jury to evaluate. The question for the court is whether an
employer's efforts on both fronts are so far above question that summary
judgment should determine these issues as a matter of law. Conversely, the
courts should entertain summary judgment on liability for the plaintiff when the
employer's failure to engage in any significant prevention efforts or failure to
respond to the plaintiff's complaint make it clear that one of the affirmative
defense prongs cannot be satisfied. 
153
This is not to suggest that summary judgment is never or even rarely
appropriate on liability in harassment cases. In Matvia v. Bald Head Island
Management 54 for example, the employer had an anti-harassment policy and
included training on the issue in its new employee orientation. When the plaintiff
complained about her supervisor's harassing behavior, the company suspended
the supervisor pending the investigation and then terminated him twelve days
later once its investigation was complete. The plaintiff's only response to these
facts was that she did not "understand" the policy or recall the orientation.1 55 In
such circumstances, where there is no factual dispute and no legitimate issue of
"reasonableness," summary judgment should be available to terminate the
proceedings.
I advocate nothing more than a uniform application of standards regardless
of the substantive nature of the underlying claim. Perhaps the court should ask
itself how often, in other contexts, it has granted a plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment in the context of a "negligence" or "reasonableness"
153. Cf. Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 E3d 678, 700 (7th Cir. 2001) ("We thus conclude, as a
matter of law, that the Board 'could not be found to have exercised reasonable care' to prevent Norsted's and
Sanders' harassing conduct and is thus not entitled to present an affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim that she
was subjected to a hostile work environment by her supervisors").
154. 259 F.3d261 (4th Cir. 2001).
155. Id. at 268.
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standard on which the plaintiff bore the burden or proof.156 If the answer is
"almost never," the court may want to rethink its consideration of the employer
liability issue at the summary judgment phase. If summary judgment is to be
granted at all, the courts at a minimum owe the plaintiff an explicit justification
in light of the defendant's heightened burden. The courts should be wary of
creating their own hostile environment for plaintiffs' sexual harassment claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
In spite of the extensive guidance provided in Faragher and Burlington
Industries, the appropriate liability standard for supervisor sexual harassment
remains at least partially unsettled. The Supreme Court's roadmap is clear on
issues of harassment resulting in a tangible employment action (quid pro quo
harassment), co-worker harassment, and supervisor harassment never reported to
the employer. But the status of liability for supervisor harassment reported to the
employer remains muddied by the failure of most lower courts to distinguish
between issues of vicarious liability (for harassment unknown to the employer)
and direct liability (for harassment reported to the employer). For many claims
of direct liability, the error is unlikely to change the ultimate result. Even when
the "right" results are reached, however, the courts have been forced to twist the
Faragher/Burlington Industries analysis to apply a defense that simply does not
fit the circumstances presented.
In other cases, the courts' failure to address the distinction between vicarious
and direct liability may have special implications for disposition on summary
judgment. Where the employer is denying liability regardless of the severity of
the harassment alleged, appropriately assessing the burden of proof becomes
critical. Even if the courts have legitimately expanded the affirmative defense of
Faragher and Burlington Industries, the employer's burden of proof on the
liability question would suggest an enhanced opportunity for the plaintiff to be
awarded summary judgment on that issue, while diminishing the employer's
prospects on that question. The fact that neither of those results is reflected in the
early returns demands the courts' more careful scrutiny and explicit justification
of their rationales.
The courts need to address these problems head-on to create an
interconnected and coherent set of standards that work consistently to foster the
prevention objectives of Title VII. A report to any supervisor should place the
employer on "notice" of the harassment and trigger the obligation to respond,
thus encouraging employers to provide adequate information and training to
those in the best position to prevent this pervasive problem. Once knowledge is
established, the employer should be able to avoid liability only by proving, as an
affirmative defense, both past prevention efforts and an adequate response to the
reported harassment. The defense closely parallels the Supreme Court's
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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approach in vicarious liability cases for unreported harassment, avoids the
problems inherent in a shifting burden of proof, and maximizes the incentives
for encouraging prevention behavior. Finally, recognizing the impact of burdens
of proof and standards of "reasonableness," the courts should hold the parties to
the same stringent standard of summary judgment applied to other kinds of
claims - practicing a judicial form of non-discrimination in the handling of
sexual harassment claims.
